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Although allocations for Russia's defense ministry have been increasing annually by 
about two percentage points of the total government budget over the past several years, 
a separate item in that document has been classified at times and, thus, may be rarely 
known or taken into consideration. Called the state defense order (gosudarstvennyi 
oboronnyi zakaz or GOZ), it allocates expenditures toward research and development 
for new generations of weapons systems which will not begin to enter the armed forces' 
inventory until after the year 2005.
Just over two billion US dollars during 1994, the GOZ budget entry more than doubled 
during each of the following two years (see chart). (1) At this rate, R&D funding would 
have eclipsed the regular defense ministry budget for 1997. However, it increased only 
slightly in the current year, suggesting a shortage of money. Legislation on GOZ had 
been signed by President Boris Yel'tsin on 27 December 1995. It comprises a five-year 
program of "scientific research and experimental design, development of weapons, 
production facilities, mobilization preparedness of the economy, series production, and 
delivery of weapons systems." (2)
According to the (civilian) first deputy defense minister, Andrei A. Kokoshin, over the 
next few years funding will become available only to modernize arms that already have 
been produced. On the other hand, a number of plants in the military-industrial complex 
(voenno-promyshlennyi kompleks or VPK) will receive "guaranteed minimal state 
orders" for new weapons during that period. The 1997-2005 arms development program 
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should provide Russia with the capability to manufacture "weapons that have no 
equivalent in the world," as Kokoshin assured members of parliament. (3)
Major General V.I. Slipchenko, then research director at the General Staff, had claimed 
earlier in an interview that these new armaments would include
• directed energy weapons
• automated high-precision systems
• deep-penetration ammunition
• super high-speed data processing and electronic warfare equipment. (4)
Attainment of the last capability may be imminent, with the purchase of four super 
computers from Silicon Graphics in California that were shipped directly to the nuclear 
weapons laboratory at Cheliabinsk-70 in late 1996. An even more powerful machine, the 
IBM RS/6000 SP (capable of performing more than ten billion calculations per second), 
had been purchased for seven million US dollars from middlemen in Europe, a 
transaction of which the Russians have boasted. (5)
Cheliabinsk-70 is one of the closed cities, located at Snezhinsk in the south Urals. Its 
research institute of technology and physics designs experimental and prototype 
nuclear warheads. The atomic energy ministry, which purchased the American super 
computers, has jurisdiction over all so-called closed cities. (6) By means of reverse 
engineering, it should be possible to construct super computers by Russian scientists 
within a relatively short period of time.
These men and women at the Russian weapons laboratories continue to develop laser, 
incoherent light source, super high-frequency electronic and electromagnetic pulse 
weapons—all of which are labeled "non-lethal." Many of them should become perfected 
before the year 2005. A new mass plasma weapon already has been tested. When 
produced, it could ionize the atmosphere so that a missile or aircraft would be forced off 
its trajectory and "destroyed by enormous stress." (7)
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More than 400 scientists, designers, engineers, and laboratory technicians from forty 
different organizations recently received prizes for their contributions during calendar 
year 1996 from the Russian government. Mentioned specifically were a director of the 
space scientific-production center, a principal designer at the Izhevsk weapons plant, a 
director of the biomedical institute, and a principal adviser on space medicine. Among 
these prize recipients, "a not insignificant number came from the military-industrial 
complex." (8)
VPK still includes more than five million employees who work at approximately 1,700 
R&D centers and defense plants. Despite the alleged shortage of funds for the military, 
Moscow continues construction (9) on a mammoth command and control center for 
nuclear war at Mount Yaman-Tau, near the city of Beloretsk in the Urals. Production, 
albeit restricted, of advanced nuclear weapons systems includes the following:(10)
• the latest SS-25 modification (Topol M-2) intercontinental ballistic missile, ready for 
series production at the end of 1996;
• a new tactical nuclear weapons system, with a range of 400 kilometers, 
successfully tested at the end of 1995 and may be already in production;
• miniature nuclear warheads, weighing under 200 lbs. each, coming off the 
assembly line;
• the first of seven strategic Boreas-class submarines, named "Yuriy Dolgoruki" after 
the founder of Moscow, which will carry the new D-31 submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles.
Even more disturbing than the above checklist from Russian sources is the recent 
interview with Ivan P. Rybkin, secretary of the Security Council, who stated that "if any 
aggressor should precipitate a conflict with us and use conventional means, we may 
respond also with nuclear weapons." He further suggested that those who might engage 
in such "military adventures" should be forewarned of Russia's response. (11)
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That, of course, represents an official admission of conventional weakness which had 
manifested itself during the war in Chechnya. The new Russian military doctrine will 
include the "first strike" proviso, as did an earlier version issued back in November 
1993. Thus, decision-makers in the Kremlin would appear to have become prisoners of 
their own disinformation offensive against the West. They anticipate war and, therefore, 
are building a modernized nuclear arsenal that they hope may indeed frighten away 
future aggressors.
Apart from the new ICBM modification and the quieter Boreas-class submarine, the new 
tactical missiles should give rise to concern. They will replace the SS-20 intermediate-
range ballistic missiles which were to have been eliminated under provisions of the INF 
Treaty. However, according to that agreement, only launchers for these IRBMs were to 
be destroyed and not their warheads. (12) The result is that the Russians who stored 
those warheads from their dismantled SS-20s can now attach them to the new tactical 
missiles which are being produced at the same plant for SS-20s in Votkinsk.
The above strategic approach has been corroborated by Yuri M. Baturin, secretary of 
the Defense Council, who recently stated that "we cannot talk seriously about repelling 
any kind of aggressor from the outside, by conventional means, for the next ten to 
twenty years." (13) He then went on to say that military reform would be completed 
around the year 2000, although that new deadline could be extended due to the 
government's inability to allocate the necessary funding.
Despite the evidence that Russia is pursuing a robust and aggressive military R&D 
program, especially in futuristic weapons as well as enhanced nuclear warheads, one 
wonders why these developments seemingly have been ignored by the White House. 
Instead, the US government has made proposals to its Russian counterpart for deeper 
reductions in ICBMs down to 2,000 or 2,500 under START III even before Moscow has 
ratified START II. An agreement in principle was reached at the 20-21 March 1997 
summit in Helsinki. (14)
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The Russians do not even claim that they are on schedule in destroying intercontinental 
missiles under START II. They have made comments that the deadline for doing so 
must be extended, complaining they have no money to finance this treaty obligation. 
The above-mentioned summit resulted in an understanding to postpone the earlier 
deadline by five years to the end of 2007. It also will result in a further infusion of dollars 
from the US Congress, World Bank ($6.4 billion already), International Monetary Fund, 
and other organizations. Russia's new budget, approved by Yel'tsin on 26 February 
1997, includes a $19.3 billion deficit. (Defense comprises one-fifth of the budget and is 
the largest single item.) A considerable part of the deficit will be financed by the $10.3 
billion multi-year loan from the IMF. The White House has already asked Congress to 
increase aid to Russia from $95 million to $241.5 million for FY 1998 under the 
Freedom Support Act alone. Yel'tsin was promised four billion dollars in new US loan 
guarantees at Helsinki.
Washington furthermore is pouring $11.5 billion into Moscow under a multi-year contract 
for the purchase of HEU or Highly Enriched Uranium (500 tons) from dismantled 
warheads, the fissile material from which should have been reprocessed by the US into 
diluted low-grade fuel for our nuclear power stations. This agreement has been violated 
from its inception, when the Russians began and have continued to deliver low-grade 
uranium. The latter may be coming from stockpiles in the closed cities of Kranoyarsk-45, 
Sverdlovsk-44, and Tomsk-7, rather than from dismantled warheads. The fait accompli 
appears to have been accepted without much or any objection by Washington.
The United States last year had excess stocks of weapons-grade uranium and 
plutonium totaling 1,914 tons compared to Russia's 1,514 tons, according to the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (15) We also have a surplus of fuel 
for our nuclear power stations. What is the rationale for importing more, which only adds 
to our surplus, especially when the Russians are not living up to the original agreement?
One of the two new first deputy prime ministers, Anatoli B. Chubais (formerly 
presidential chief of staff and potential successor to Premier Chernomyrdin), was 
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interviewed earlier this year. He made a statement, suggestive of the paranoia prevalent 
in the Kremlin, as follows: (16)
 ! "It is known that plans exist for a kind of cordon sanitaire around Russia,
! beginning with Azerbaijan and ending at the Baltic, in such a way as to separate 
! Russia from the civilized would and isolate it… We cannot accept such plans 
! under any condition."
This in turn led Defense Minister Igor N. Rodionov to warn East Central European 
countries that their capital cities would be targeted by Russian tactical nuclear missiles if 
they joined NATO. Since the former army general did not receive any reprimand, it 
would appear that his sentiments are shared by the small leadership group in the 
Kremlin.
Unfortunately, those individuals are taking for granted the assumption that the West will 
continue its support regardless of what they say or do. The 17-member Coordinating 
Committee for Multilateral Export Control (CoCom), which had maintained an embargo 
on high technology transfer to the Soviet military-industrial complex, no longer exists. It 
has deteriorated into an "honor" system that failed with the recent sale of super 
computers to Moscow.
Russians have broken arms reduction/control agreements with impunity and continue to 
do so. After they violated the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, the West 
agreed to renegotiate that agreement, an activity which is taking place currently in 
Vienna. The extent of concessions made by Clinton at Helsinki inevitably will become 
known, although such behavior cannot reform the Yel'tsin crowd.
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 [Exchange rates for $1US amounted to R1,989 (1994); R4,554 (1995); R5,200(1996); 
and R5,500(1997). In budget documents, the State Defense Order may come under the 
acronym NIOKR (Nauchno-issledovatel'skie i opytno-konstrukorskie raboty) or Scientific 
and Experimental Design Work. See item 3 in "O federal'nom biudzhete na 1997 god," 
Rossiiskaya gazeta, 4 March 1997, p. 3.]
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